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Commercial Law-Maybank v. S.S. Kresge: Reasonable Notice
Requirement: A "Booby-Trap" for the Personally Injured
Consumer
One of the most difficult aspects of warranty law is determining what con-
stitutes a "reasonable time"1 as the phrase is used in the Uniform Commercial
Code (Code) section 2-607(3)(a) requirement that a buyer who has accepted
goods "must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have dis-
covered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy
. . "2 The issue becomes more troublesome when the notice provision is
applied to a personally injured retail consumer, because the requirement often
is overlooked and thus operates as a "booby-trap for the unwary.' 3 In its
attempt to resolve the uncertainty of section 2-607(3)(a) as employed in con-
sumer injury actions, the North Carolina Supreme Court held in Maybank v.
S. S. Kresge Co .4that a three-year delay in notifying the seller of a breach of
an implied warranty of merchantability5 was not unreasonable as a matter of
law and thus did not bar plaintiff from remedy.6 By failing to find such an
extended delay to be unreasonable as a matter of law, the court followed the
judicial trend of circumventing the reasonable notice requirement in the stat-
ute when the plaintiff is an injured consumer. The court's elimination of the
reasonable notice requirement renders this aspect of recovery for breach of an
implied warranty of merchantability similar to the no-notice requirement of a
strict liability in-tort theory of recovery.7
In Maybank plaintiff purchased a package of three flashcubes from de-
fendant K-Mart.8 When plaintiff opened the package on July 21, 1972, none
of the cubes appeared damaged. After placing one cube containing four
flashbulbs in her camera, plaintiff took four pictures without incident; after
placing a second cube on her camera, plaintiff pressed the shutter button and
the flashcube exploded. The force of the explosion knocked plaintiffs glasses
off and the comer of her left eye was cut, resulting in temporary blindness;
consequently, plaintiff was hospitalized for one week and was absent from
work for three weeks. The injury continued to cause the eye to become easily
1. A. SQUILLANTE & J. FONSECA, 3 WILLISTON ON SALES § 22-11, at 303 (4th ed. 1974).
See, Comment, Notice Requirement in Warranty 4ctions Involving Personal injury, 51 CAL. L.
Rv. 586, 587 (1963).
2. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (1978) (enacted in North Carolina as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-
607(3)(a) (1965)).
3. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTs § 97, at 655 (4th ed. 1971).
4. 302 N.C. 129, 273 S.E.2d 681 (1981).
5. "A warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if
the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind." N.Y. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-314(1) (1965);
U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1978).
6. 302 N.C. at 135, 273 S.E.2d at 685.
7. See infra text accompanying note 70.
8. 302 N.C. at 130, 273 S.E.2d at 682. Defendant S. S. Kresge Company trades under the
name of K-Mart.
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fatigued and to affect her reading.9
Plaintiff did not complain to the manufacturer, G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., be-
cause she claimed that the carton contained instructions for notification only
in the event the flashcube failed to flash-not in the event the flashcube ex-
ploded.10 Nor was defendant informed prior to the institution of plaintiff's
suit that the flashcube was defective."
The court of appeals reversed defendant's directed verdict and found that
plaintiff's evidence made out a prima facie case of breach of an implied war-
ranty of merchantability. 12 The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed that
part of the court of appeals' decision but held that the court erred in finding
that plaintiffs failure to give adequate notice was an affirmative defense
waived by defendant when it did not raise the issue. 13 Instead, the court held
that notification was a condition precedent to a buyer's action, thus placing
upon the plaintiff buyer the burden of pleading and proving that seasonable
notification had been given.14 The supreme court then determined that plain-
tiff made a prima facie showing that the notice-which was given by the filing
of the suit three years after discovery of the defect-was notification within a
"reasonable time."'15
In reaching its decision, the court applied the policies behind the notice
requirement to the facts and circumstances of the case. Three policies were
mentioned by the court: (1) to enable the seller to make efforts to cure the
breach in order to minimize the buyer's damage and the seller's liability;16
(2) to give the seller a reasonable opportunity to learn the facts so that he may
prepare for negotiations with the injured consumer, and if need be, his defense
in a suit; 17 and (3) "to provide a seller with a terminal point in time for liabil-
9. Id. at 131, 273 S.E.2d at 683.
10. Id. at 131,273 S.E.2d at 683. Defendant's third-party claim against G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc.
was severed for trial at a later date.
11. Id. at 133, 273 S.E.2d at 682-83.
12. 46 N.C. App. 687, 266 S.E.2d 409 (1980). The court of appeals found plaintif's evidence
insufficient to establish claims for negligence, strict liability, and breach of express warranty. The
appellate court therefore affirmed the trial court's dismissal of those claims. Id. at 692-93, 266
S.E.2d at 411-12.
13. 302 N.C. at 132, 273 S.E.2d at 683. The court of appeals relied on its decision in Reid v.
Eckerd Drugs, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476, 485, 253 S.E.2d 344, 350, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 612, 257
S.E.2d 219 (1979). Reid required that failure to give notice of breach be asserted as an affirmative
defense. 302 N.C. at 133, 273 S.E.2d at 683. Although the timeliness of notification was not
challenged by either party at trial, the court of appeals considered this issue sua sponte. 46 N.C.
App. at 693, 266 S.E.2d at 413.
14. 302 N.C. at 133, 273 S.E.2d at 683. Accord L.A. Green Seed Co. v. Williams, 246 Ark.
463, 469, 438 S.W.2d 717, 720 (1969); Carney v. I. J. Kayle & Assocs., 122 II. App. 2d 403, 407,
259 N.E.2d 304, 306 (1970); A. SQUILLANTE & J. FONSECA, supra note I, 22-1I, at 301.
15. 302 N.C. at 136, 273 S.E.2d at 684.
16. Id. at 134, 273 S.E.2d at 684. Accord, L.A. Green Seed Co. v. Williams, 246 Ark. at 468,
438 S.W.2d at 720; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-10, at 421 (2d ed. 1980).
17. 302 N.C. at 134,273 S.E.2d at 684. Accord Owen v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 273 F.2d 140,
143 (9th Cir. 1959); Columbia Axle Co. v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 63 F.2d 206, 208 (6th Cir.
1933); Trslow & Fulle, Inc. v. Diamond Bottling Corp., 112 Conn. 181, 187, 151 A. 492, 495
(1930); J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 16, § 11-10, at 422.
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ity.' i8 The court first noted that enabling the seller to cure the breach does not
apply to personal injury cases because the damage has already occurred and is
irreversible. 19 In assessing the weight to be given the other two objectives, the
court relied extensively on Official Comment 4 to section 2-607: "'[a] reason-
able time' for notification from a retail consumer is to be judged by different
standards [from those of a merchant] so that in [the retail consumer's] case it
will be extended, for the rule of requiring notification is designed to defeat
commercial bad faith, not to deprive a good faith consumer of his remedy."'20
Considering this comment and the foregoing objectives, the court determined
that the pertinent conflict was between the policy of providing the seller an
opportunity to prepare for trial and that of providing an injured good-faith
consumer a remedy.2 1 Since the facts revealed that the defendant seller could
adequately prepare for trial because the exploding flashcube and the carton in
which it was purchased were available as evidence, the court found that both
policies could be furthered if plaintiff were entitled to go to the jury on the
issue of seasonable notice.22
As this was a case of first impression in North Carolina, the court had
little guidance from North Carolina sources in formulating its opinion. The
varied treatment given by courts in other jurisdictions to notice requirements
in personal injury actions coupled with the confusion existing over this issue at
common law23 magnified the difficulty of its task.
Originally, common-law courts generally considered the buyer's accept-
ance of title to goods as a waiver of the seller's liability from certain contrac-
tual duties so that notice of defect was seldom at issue.24 In one case, the New
York Court of Appeals found that in the absence of fraud or latent defects, an
implied warranty in a contract of sale did not survive acceptance of the
goods.25 The justice of this rule was often questioned.26 A milder rule was
foreshadowed by a court which held that an implied warranty could survive
the buyer's acceptance; however, the court emphasized the practical impor-
tance of the buyer notifying the seller of defects in the goods.27 The court
18. 302 N.C. at 135, 273 S.E.2d at 684. The court stated that this is the least compelling
policy. Id. Accord J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 16, § 11-10, at 422.
19. 302 N.C. at 134, 273 S.E.2d at 684.
20. U.C.C. § 2-607 comment 4 (1978).
21. 302 N.C. at 135, 273 S.E.2d at 685.
22. Id. Following the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision, the parties settled out of
court.
23. See, e.g., Metro Inv. Corp. v. Portland Rd. Lumber Yard, Inc., 263 Or. 76, 79, 501 P.2d
312, 314 (1972). See also L. VOLD, THE LAW OF SALES 460 (2d ed. 1959); Annot., 93 A.L.R. 3d.
363, 368 (1979). The quandary was caused by the "desire to give finality to transactions in which
the goods were accepted but also to accommodate a buyer who desperately needed the goods
immediately despite their defective quality." Metro. Inv. Corp., 263 Or. at 79, 501 P.2d at 314.
24. 3 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRAcTs § 714 (3d ed. 1961 & Supp.
1981).
25. Gaylord Mfg. Co. v. Allen, 53 N.Y. 515, 519 (1873) (stating the prevailing common law
rule).
26. L. VOLD, supra note 23.
27. Morse v. Moore, 83 Me. 473, 480-81, 22 A. 362, 364 (1891) (ice shipped by seller did not
conform to contract).
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seemed to recognize the necessity of a rule that would be capable of some
certainty in its application, that would avoid the hardship on the buyer under
the waiver rule, and that would give the seller some protection against stale
claims.28 In an attempt to meet these needs, section 49 of the Uniform Sales
Act provided that acceptance of goods does not preclude a buyer's recovery
against the seller for breach of warranty, "[b]ut, if, after acceptance of the
goods, the buyer fails to give notice to the seller of the breach of any promise
of warranty within a reasonable time after the buyer knows or ought to know
of such breach, the seller shall not be liable therefor. ' 29
Despite the statutory requirement of notice in section 49, several courts
fashioned theories that relieved personal injury plaintiffs from this demand in
breach of warranty actions. In holding that section 49 was not applicable to
personal injury actions, the Supreme Court of Indiana in Wright-Bachman,
Inc. v. Hodnelt30 relied on an interpretation of section 70 of the Uniform Sales
Act, which states that nothing in the statute shall affect the right of a buyer "to
recover . . . special damages in any case where by law" such damages are
recoverable.3 1 Since such damages could have been recovered without notice
before the Act, and since damages for personal injuries are special or conse-
quential damages, the court found that section 70 exempted personal injury
plaintiffs from the notice requirement. 32 In Kennedy v. F W. Woolworth Co.33
the New York Appellate Division held that the notice provision had no rela-
tion to goods sold for immediate human consumption. The court argued that
the operation of the statute should be confined to "sales of goods whose in-
spection or use discloses a defect of quality, lack of conformance to sample,
failure to comply with description, or other cognate circumstances, which
causes money damage to the vendee."'34
28. Cf. Whitfield v. Jessup, 31 Cal. 2d 826, 828, 193 P.2d 1, 2 (1948) (reasonableness is to be
determined from the particular circumstances); Hazelton v. First Nat'l Stores, 88 N.H. 409, 412,
190 A. 280, 282 (1937): "'A rule seems desirable which is capable ofsome certainty in its applica-
tion and which at the same time avoids the hardship on the buyer of holding that acceptance of
title necessarily deprives him of the seller's obligations and also avoids the hardship on the seller
of allowing a buyer at any time within the Statute of Limitations to assert that the goods are
defective though no objection was made when they were received."' (quoting 2 J. WILLISTON,
WILLISTON ON SAFn-s § 434(a) (2d ed. 1948)).
29. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 49 (1942).
30. 235 Ind. 307, 133 N.E.2d 713 (1956) (plaintiff was injured when ladder purchased from
defendant broke, causing scaffold on which plaintiff was working to collapse).
31. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 70 (1942).
32. 235 Ind. at 312, 133 N.E.2d at 715. Contra Wojciuk v. United States Rubber Co., 19 Wis.
2d 235a, 235f, 122 N.W.2d 737, 740 (1963):
the purpose of sec. 70 is to make it clear that under the sales act liability arising out of
breach of warranty may extend to interest and special damages, even though the remedy
provisions of the act do not mention either, and that it was not the purpose of sec. 70 to
exempt such elements from the part of sec. 49 which provides that upon buyer's failure to
give timely notice of breach, "the seller shall not be liable therefor."
Id. at 235e, 122 N.W.2d at 739-40.
33. 205 A.D. 648, 200 N.Y.S. 121 (1923) (candy sold by defendant caused plaintiffs daughter
to become ill).
34. Id. at 649-50, 200 N.Y.S. at 122. Kennedy was followed in Silverstein v. R.H. Macy &
Co., 266 A.D. 5, 40 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1943), a breach of warranty action in which plaintiff was in-jured from a fall while performing gymnastics on a chinning bar sold to him by defendant. The
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Most courts refused to follow Kennedy and Wright-Bachman and found
that there should be no distinction between commercial and personal injury
plaintiffs. For example, one court held that the notice requirement does apply
to the sale of goods for immediate human consumption,35 thereby refusing to
recognize the Kennedy distinction between sales of food for immediate human
consumption and sales of food for less immediate use. The court pointed out
that the general warranty provisions of the Sales Act apply to sales of food and
that section 49 likewise should apply.36 Another court looked to the terms of
section 49, which applies to all "goods." 37 As defined in section 76 of the Sales
Act, food clearly came within the definition of "goods," 38 and therefore the
section 49 notice requirement was held to be a necessary prerequisite in ac-
tions involving the sale of food.39 One court declined to follow Kennedy by
refusing to acknowledge a distinction between commercial and personal injury
situations, noting that such a distinction "would give rise to innumerable stale
claims and create a double standard of recovery."' 40 Seeking to explain the
anomalous results presented by the above decisions, one court stated that the
Kennedy and Wright-Bachman courts, along with several scholars who have
criticized the majority rule that requires notice in personal injury actions, are
"expressing dissatisfaction with the statute, rather than a choice between rea-
sonable interpretations of its provisions." 4 1
This dilemma continues today because section 2-607(3)(a) of the Uniform
Commercial Code carries over the language and case law of section 49.42 The
exception to the requirement of notice carved out by New York courts after
Kennedy in cases involving the sale of goods for immediate human consump-
tion continues to retain some vitality. In one case plaintiff sustained personal
New York Court of Appeals has not accepted or rejected Kennedy or Silverstein. In Sylvester v.
R.H. Macy & Co., 291 N.Y. 552, 50 N.E.2d 656 (1943) (per curiam), however, a personal injury
action in which plaintiff contended that no notice was required or alternatively that notice was
given by the institution of the action, the court of appeals affirmed without opinion the lower
court's judgment for the plaintiff.
35. Hazelton v. First Nat'1 Stores, 88 N.H. 409, 413, 190 A. 280, 282 (1937) (in action for
damages caused by eating pork chops infested with trichinae, unexplained delay of six months
after purchase in giving notice held to preclude recovery). Accord Schuler v. Union News Co.,
295 Mass. 350, 354, 4 N.E.2d 465, 467 (1936).
36. 88 N.H. at 413, 190 A. at 282.
37. Baum v. Murray, 23 Wash. 2d 890, 900, 162 P.2d 801, 806 (1945) (plaintiffs became ill
after purchasing sausage infested with trichinae).
38. See UNIFORM SALES ACT § 76 (1942).
39. 23 Wash. 2d at 900, 162 P.2d at 806.
40. Smith v. Pizitz of Bessemer, Inc., 271 Ala. 101, 104, 122 So. 2d 591, 593 (1960) (plaintiff
injured when a nightgown caught fire and burst into flames).
41. Wojciuk v. United States Rubber Co., 19 Wis. 2d 235a, 235e, 122 N.W.2d 737, 739 (1963)
(plaintiff and husbind sought damages for wife's personal injuries sustained when automobile
overturned as a result of a blowout).
42. REPORT OF THE LAW REVIsION COMMISSION FOR 1955, 1 STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 529 (1955). The comment to § 2-607 states that the provision is to "continue the
prior basic policies with respect to the acceptance of goods. U.C.C. § 2-607 comment
(1978). Because § 2-607 is a continuation of § 49, most states still rely upon case law decided
under the Sales Act as authority for cases holding under the Code. See, eg., San Antonio v.
Warwick Club Ginger Ale Co., 104 R.I. 700, 703, 249 A.2d 778, 781 (1968). Section 2-607(3)(a)
accords with Main v. Field, 144 N.C. 307,56 S.E. 943 (1907), which held that a buyer of goods has
a reasonable time after acceptance to notify the seller of a breach of warranty.
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injuries as a result of her use of an oral contraceptive manufactured by de-
fendant, and the court, quoting Kennedy, found that the requirement of timely
notice did not apply.43
In the midst of thee irreconcilable decisions, the North Carolina
Supreme Court decided Maybank by following the majority rule that seasona-
ble notice is required from a plaintiff suing for personal injury damages.44
The court dealt primarily with the question whether the three-year notice
given by plaintiff was a "reasonable time" within which notice should be
given45 and, in making that determination, focused on the policies behind the
notice requirement. The court, however, gave inadequate treatment to these
and other policy arguments. One policy the court failed to examine is the
significance of seasonable notice in negotiating settlements. The filing of a
complaint cannot be "seasonable" notice of a defect; it only serves to give
notice of litigation, and therefore avoids one purpose of the notice require-
ment46 expressed in comment 4 to section 2-607(3)(a): "[t]he notification
which saves the buyer's rights under this Article. . . opens the way for normal
settlement through negotiation. 47 The court did point out that one goal be-
hind the notice provision is to "afford the seller a reasonable opportunity to
learn the facts so that he may adequately prepare for negotiation and defend
himself in a suit,"4 8 but it elaborated only on the defense aspect of fact discov-
ery.4 9 It is clear that in this instance the settlement policy was unfulfilled since
the seller did not receive notice until the action was instituted, thus making it
impossible for the parties to reach a settlement before litigation as contem-
plated by the Code.
Another underlying rationale for the seasonable notice requirement, that
of providing the "seller with a terminal point in time for liability,"50 was men-
tioned by the court but also was given inadequate treatment. The court felt
this to be one of "the least compelling [policies] because a 'reasonable time' is
not a point which can be accurately predicted and because the statute of limi-
tations reflects the legislature's judgment as to how long the seller should be
subject to suit."51 This reasoning is unpersuasive, however, because if the
statute of limitations alone is sufficient to protect the seller, then the require-
ment that notice be given in a "reasonable time" would be superfluous; rather,
the provision would simply call for notice to be given only if the opportunity
to gather evidence still exists. Furthermore, a "terminal point in time for lia-
bility" may be inconsequential when a plaintifi's delay in giving notice is justi-
fied, but not when there has been a lapse of three years for no apparent reason.
43. Fischer v. Mead Johnson Laboratories, 41 A.D.2d 737, 737-38, 341 N.Y.S.2d 257, 258-59
(1973).
44. 302 N.C. at 133, 273 S.E.2d at 683.
45. Id. at 134-36, 273 S.E.2d at 684-85.
46. See infra note 74.
47. U.C.C. § 2-607 comment 4 (1978).
48. 302 N.C. at 134, 273 S.E.2d at 684.
49. Id. at 135, 273 S.E.2d at 684.
50. Id.
51. Id. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 16, § 11-10, at 422.
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After examining these policies, the court looked to the facts and circum-
stances in the case and decided that the seller had not been prejudiced since
the defective flashcube and carton in which it had been purchased were avail-
able at trial. The court therefore focused primarily on the facts and circum-
stances bearing on the reasonableness of the delay.52 This method of
investigation is consistent with the requirement of section 1-204(2), which pro-
vides that "[w]hat is a reasonable time for taking any action depends on the
nature, purpose and circumstances of such action." 53 The only factor ex-
pressly considered in Maybank, however, was the "nature" of the purchaser.54
In differentiating between the standards to be applied to a retail consumer
and a merchant buyer, the court cited comment 4,55 which distinguishes be-
tween the two 56 even though the statute itself does not. Though the comments
often aid in the construction of the statute and frequently are accorded great
weight, "they have not been enacted by the legislature and are not necessarily
representative of legislative intent."57 The Maybank court's primary reliance
on comment 4 is, therefore, open to dispute, particularly because the court
interpreted comment 4 to be inconsistent with section 2-607(3)(a). The court
essentially eliminated the notice requirement for personal injury plaintiffs
through the use of a statement that the legislature, for whatever reasons, did
not enact. Moreover, the court's reliance on the authority of the comment is
inconsistent with its treatment of the settlement policy. While it relied heavily
on the comment in order to establish the differing standards to be used for a
retail consumer and a merchant buyer, it swiftly dismissed the comment's dis-
cussion of the settlement objective.58
The court's position could conceivably have been justified by relying on
the language of the Uniform Commercial Code itself. Section 2-104(1) defines
"merchant" as one who "holds himself out as having knowledge or skill pecu-
liar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction," 59 whereas a retail
buyer is someone who lacks the special knowledge or the peculiar skill related
to the goods that are the subject matter of the transaction. It can be inferred
from the section 2-104(1) definition of "merchant" that the purposes of Article
2 would be better fulfilled by holding the merchant buyer to a more "stringent
52. 302 N.C. at 136, 273 S.E.2d at 684.
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-204(a) (1965). U.C.C. § 1-204(2) (1978). In Schneider v. Person,
34 Pa. D. & C.2d 10, 12 (C.P. Lehigh County 1964), the Pennsylvania court cited § 1-204(2) in its
determination of what constituted "reasonable notice."
54. 302 N.C. at 136, 273 S.E.2d at 684. Other factors often considered by courts include: the
nature of the goods, see, eg., Jarstad v. Tacoma Outdoor Recreation, Inc., 10 Wash. App. 551, 519
P.2d 278 (1974); the nature of the defect or breach, see, e.g., Steiner v. Jarrett, 130 Cal. App. 2d
869, 280 P.2d 235 (1954); the type of seller, see generally 2 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607:36 (3d ed. 1981); and any circumstances serving to excuse
or justify an otherwise unreasonable delay, id. at § 2-607:37.
55. 302 N.C. at 135, 273 S.E.2d at 684-85.
56. U.C.C. § 2-607, comment 4 (1978).
57. Simmons v. Clemco Indus., 368 So. 2d 509, 514 (Ala. 1979). The comments were not
enacted by the General Assembly. See Law of May 26, 1965, ch. 700, 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws 768.
58. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
59. U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1978).
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standard of commercial conduct than ... the retail consumer."'60 As a result
of the more rigorous standard of conduct expected of a merchant, it follows
that a less rigorous standard should be expected of a consumer who must give
notice under section 2-607(3)(a).
Not only is the Maybank decision weakened by its fundamental reliance
on comment 4, but the court's refusal to find three years to be an unreasonable
delay as a matter of law stands contrary to the majority of cases dealing with
seasonable notice requirements in personal injury actions. Although the re-
quirement of notice within a "reasonable time" seems to be a qualitative re-
quirement in that the facts and circumstances of each case should be
considered, it is signiicant that quantitative considerations seem to have influ-
enced many courts. One court, in determining that notice given by the injured
plaintiff to the seller twelve months after the injury was not given within a
"reasonable time," specifically considered cases in which notice given more
than one year after breach was found to be unreasonable as a matter of law in
the absence of explanation. 61 In California this quantitative consideration is
manifested in section 340(3) of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which
is a one-year statute of limitations that has been interpreted to apply to all
personal injury or death actions, regardless of whether they arise in tort or in
contract.
62
Courts that have not found a one-year or more notice untimely as a mat-
ter of law have cited compelling reasons for not doing so. An Illinois court,
for example, refused to find that notice given almost four years after plaintiff's
injuries was unreasonable notice. 63 In that case, plaintiff suffered a stroke on
October 21, 1967 as a result of taking oral contraceptives, but she did not learn
of the contraceptive's potential for causing strokes until she read January 1970
Senate committee findings related to oral contraceptives.6" The court ex-
plained that a person complaining of a breach of an implied warranty must
have some knowledge of the identity of the causal agent before he or she may
ascertain to whom notice should be directed; therefore, the plaintiff was al-
60. A. SQUILLANTE & J. FONSECA, supra note 1, § 22-11, at 300. Section 1-102(1) provides
that the Code "shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and
policies." N.C. GEM. STAT. § 1-201(1) (1965); U.C.C. § 1-102(l) (1978).
61. San Antonio v. Warwick Club Ginger Ale Co., 104 R.I. 700, 708 n.2, 248 A.2d 778, 782
n.2 (1968) (plaintiffsustained injuries to hand while opening bottle of soda water). One key factor
that influenced the court's decision was the unavailability of evidence. 104 R.I. at 709, 248 A.2d at
782-83. In Wagmeister v. A.H. Robbins Co., 64 Il. App. 3d 964, 382 N.E.2d 23 (1978), in which
plaintiff became pregnant and delivered a stillborn baby despite prior implantation of a Dalkon
Shield, the court held that notice given thirty months after the delivery did not satisfy § 2-
607(3)(a) as a matter of law. Id. at 966-67, 382 N.E.2d at 24-25. In several cases in which less
than one year's notice was given, courts found notice to be unreasonable as a matter of law even
when there was justification for the delay. Eg., Silvera v. Broadway Dep't Store, Inc., 35 F. Supp.
625 (S.D. Cal. 1940) (7 months after discoloration of forehead from hatband not timely notice);
Hazelton v. First Nat'l Stores, 88 N.H. 409, 190 A. 280 (1937) (plaintiff injured by eating pork
chops infested with trichinae; unexplained delay of six months held to preclude recovery). See
also Annot., supra note 23, § 11, at 399-402.
62. Freedman, Products Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 PRAc. LAW. 49, 62
(1964).
63. Goldstein v. G. D. Searle & Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 344, 378 N.E.2d 1083 (1978).
64. Id. at 345-46, 378 N.E.2d at 1085.
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lowed to go to the jury on the issue whether the notice given on October 15,
1971 was seasonable.65 Unlike that case, there was no significant policy rea-
son in Maybank to impede a finding that a three-year delay was untimely.
In light of the aforementioned difficulties with the Maybank decision, it
seems probable that the court had a strong unarticulated motive for holding
that plaintiff's delay was not per se unreasonable. Perhaps the court was act-
ing consistent with those courts before it, such as the Wright-Bachman and
Kennedy courts, which created distinctions to abrogate the notice requirement
for personal injury plaintiffs. The court appears to have accomplished this
abrogation by replacing the notice requirement for personal injury consumer-
plaintiffs with a judicially mandated no-notice requirement similar to that in a
strict tort liability theory of recovery.66
Much of the confusion encountered in the application of the reasonable
notice provision of section 2-607(3)(a) has arisen from the development of the
theory of strict tort liability and its application to transactions normally con-
sidered to be within the ambit of contract law.67 The Uniform Commercial
Code applies to warranties arising out of contract, while strict tort liability
applies to breaches of warranty arising in tort; however, the "two theories
overlap resulting in parallel but different rules governing the same prob-
lem."68 The breach of contract warranty theory of recovery has proved to
have some undesirable complications for the injured plaintiff. Notice, the sine
qua non of a contract warranty action, is often overlooked by the injured
plaintiff buyer because "it seems so utterly out of place in a personal injury
action." 69 On the other hand, one of the virtues of strict tort liability actions is
that the notice requirement does not apply.70 It has been suggested that per-
haps the notice provision should operate only in instances in which buyers
65. Id. at 351-52, 378 N.E.2d at 1089. Evidence of bad faith also existed on the manufac-
turer's part; prior to plaintiff's injury, the manufacturer was aware of complaints by contraceptive
users of injuries similar to those sustained by the plaintiff. Id. at 351, 378 N.E.2d at 1089. Even in
cases involving less than a one-year delay, the courts had justifiable reasons for finding that the
plaintiff should be allowed to go to the jury on the notice issue. E.g., Bonker v. Ingersoll Prods.
Corp., 132 F. Supp. 5 (D. Mass. 1955) (plaintiff, injured by eating defendant's canned food prod-
uct, had several operations during the next three months, was confined to bed for over a month
and could not swallow for four months after the injury; whether notice given four months after
injury and two weeks after final operation was given within reasonable time was deemed jury
question).
66. The North Carolina General Assembly has not adopted strict liability in products liabil-
ity cases. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-1 (1979).
67. Note, Notice of Breach and The Uniform Commercial Code, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 520, 520
n.5 (1973). The doctrine of strict tort liability was first espoused in Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
68. Note, supra note 67, at 527.
69. Woods, The Personal njury Action in Warranty-Has the Arkansas Strict Liability Statute
Rendered it Obsolete?, 28 ARK. L. REv. 335, 339 (1974).
70. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 263, 391 P.2d 168, 172, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896,
900, (1964); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 16, § 11-10, at 421. Other problems avoided by
strict liability actions are privity requirements and disclaimers. Annot., supra note 23, at 371.
Breach of warranty actions often have been favored by plaintiffs because all that must be proved
to establish the seller's liability is that the product was defective at the time it left the seller's or
manufacturer's possession, not that the seller or manufacturer was negligent. Woods, supra note
69, at 336.
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could conceivably use stale and unfounded claims of breach of warranty to
avoid or to lower payment for goods.71 Moreover,
[i]f the legislatures believed that there should be a notice provision or
an exceptionally short period of limitation in product liability cases,
why did they not extend this protection to vendors and makers in all
such cases (whether grounded on negligence or warranty), since the
practical problems of stale claims and fraud are the same in both
types?72
Despite the burdens presented the plaintiff by section 2-607(3)(a), the lan-
guage of that section is broad and a majority of courts have held it applicable
in cases involving personal injuries.73 Nonetheless, in order to circumvent the
statute, courts have resorted to rather transparent devices such as holding that
a long delay may be "reasonable," 74 as the Maybank court has done, or find-
ing that the provision was not intended to apply to personal injuries, 75 as the
Wright-Bachman and Kennedy courts did. Such decisions present an impedi-
ment to the protection of sellers, one of the goals of the Code.76 The language
of the notice provision applies to personal injury actions and therefore would
offer protection to sellers, but the limitation of that provision which comes
from court holdings and not revisions of the statute serves to defeat that pur-
pose.77 It is self-evident that courts disfavor the lack of notice defense when it
is invoked against an injured consumer.78 Nevertheless, the Code recognizes
instances in which a seller's liability can be limited by failure to give notice.
"[l]f legislative supremacy means anything, it must mean that the courts can-
not create a new rule of strict tort liability that will displace the products-
liability scheme of the Uniform Commercial Code.' 79 The Maybank court
arguably has made a move in that direction by refusing to find a three-year
delay, for which there was no justified excuse, to be unreasonable as a matter
of law.
A solution to the tendency of courts to evade the notice provision would
be to amend the statute to exclude personally injured consumer buyers,
71. James, Products Liability (pt. 2), 34 TEx. L. RE,. 192, 197 (1955).
72. Id. at 197-98 (emphasis in original).
73. Note, supra note 67, at 587.
74. PROssER, supra note 3, § 97, at 655. Another circumvention tactic used by the Maybank
court was declining to find that notification given by the filing of plaintiff's action was not notifica-
tion as contemplated by the Code. See 302 N.C. at 136, S.E.2d at 685. Section 2-607(3)(a) clearly
states that unless proper notice is given, the buyer is barred from any remedy; therefore, a sum-
mons and complaint (exercising a remedy) arguably cannot constitute a notice as contemplated by
the Code. Solomon & Son v. Thomas, 45 Luzerne Leg. Reg. R. 269 (C.P. Luzerne County, Pa.
1955) (court granted leave to amend the complaint); A. SQUILLANTE & J. FONSECA, supra note 1,
§ 22-11, at 308. But see Simons v. Clemco Indus., 368 So. 2d 509 (Ala. 1979) (court did not
require notice prior to filing of'suit); Goldstein v. G. D. Searle & Co., 62 IlI. App. 2d 344, 378
N.E.2d 1083 (1978) (filing of complaint as notice allowed in personal injury action in light of the
les stringent policy toward retail consumers).
75. PRossER, supra note 3, § 97, at 655-56.
76. Note, supra note 67, at 525.
77. Id. at 525-26.
78. J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 16, § 11-10, at 423.
79. Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 4024 and the Uniorm Commercial Code, 22
STAN. L. Rav. 713, 755 (1970).
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thereby accomplishing strict liability via warranty instead of tort.80 In effect,
this would enforce the present wording of section 2-607(3)(a) in commercial
situations and would abandon the notice requirement in consumer cases.8 1
This approach has been codified in subsection 7 of Maine's version of section
2-607, which provides: "Subsection 3(a) shall not apply where the remedy is
for personal injury resulting from any breach."8 2 South Carolina has effec-
tively achieved the same result by amending subsection (3)(a) to include the
following: "however, no notice of injury to the person in the case of consumer
goods shall be required."8 3 The Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform
Commercial Code rejected suggestions for such amendments for the following
reason: "[T]he amendment to subsection (3)(a) may have merit, since notice
may be dispensed with by classifying the liability as a strict liability in tort.
But it seems unnecessary if 'reasonable time' is read as suggested in Comment
4."84 This position is troublesome for two reasons: (1) comment 4 is not part
of the statute, and (2) requests for amendment were made in the face of con-
flicting treatment given section 2-607(3)(a) and comment 4 by courts in decid-
ing personal injury cases, thus defeating the goal of uniformity.
In Maybank the North Carolina Supreme Court has in effect furthered
the trend of courts to create a new rule similar to the requirements of strict tort
liability. Unfortunately, it has done this by relying primarily on comment 4,
instead of the statute itself, and by deemphasizing any policies that would
weigh in favor of the seller. Through its decision, the court has virtually writ-
ten out the notice requirement of section 2-607(3)(a) for personal injury plain-
tiffs. In light of the supreme court's opinion and until the North Carolina
legislature recognizes the need to amend the Code, a defense lawyer must be
cognizant of the court's proclivity to find that a delayed notice in a personal
injury suit will in all likelihood not be found to be unreasonable as a matter of
law.
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80. Freeman & Dressel, Warranty Law in Maryland Product Liability Cases: Strict Liability
Incognito?, 5 U. BALT. L. REv. 47, 76 (1975). Prosser suggested that problems with warranty
might have been solved by amending the Code. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to
the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 801 (1966).
81. Note, Economic Losses and Strict Products Liability: 4 Record ofJudicial Confusion Be-
tween Contract and Tort, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 118, 124 (1978). Notice might be required in
personal injury actions in order to guard against claims generated by afterthought. See, e.g.,
Wojciuk v. United States Rubber Co., 19 Wis. 2d 235a, 235f, 122 N.W.2d 737, 740 (1963). The
statute of limitations, however, should provide enough protection against this. See, e.g., Simmons
v. Clemco Indus., 368 So.2d 509, 514 (Ala. 1979).
82. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. XI, § 2-607(7) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
83. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-607(3)(a) (Law. Co-op. 1977).
84. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REPORT No. 3,
48 (1967).
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